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The Brazilian government raises an amount of taxes that represents 35% of GDP and spends more than 
two-thirds of this on social programmes. These shares are in pair with the OECD averages and well in 
excess of Latin America averages. However, while the tax-benefit system in OECD countries notably 
reduces market inequality, in Brazil the government has not been able to significantly alleviate inequality 
and poverty. This paper investigates the impact of the government budget, particularly taxes and cash 
transfers, on income distribution in Brazil, and evaluates its efficiency and effectiveness in reducing 
inequality and poverty. The analysis also illustrates how microsimulation is a useful and powerful 
method for evaluating the impact of policy on income distribution. 
 
JEL: H22, H23, C81, 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite raising an amount of taxes equivalent to 35 per cent of the country’s GDP and 
spending about seventy per cent of that on social programmes – close to the OECD 
average spending, as a proportion of GDP, and well above the average in other Latin 
American countries –, the Brazilian government has not been able to significantly 
alleviate inequality and poverty. In fact, Brazil’s income distribution remains one of the 
world’s most unequal, and a large share of its population still lives below the poverty 
line.  
Brazil is an exception to the observed international pattern, where high income 
inequality is generally associated with low levels of tax revenue as a proportion of 
GDP. In Figure 1, we notice that the United Kingdom and Spain, for example, with a 
similar tax burden to that of Brazil, have a much lower income inequality as indicated 
by the Gini coefficient. On the other hand, Mexico and Chile, with Gini coefficients 
close to that for Brazil, have a much lower tax burden. 
To an extent, the relatively low Gini coefficients of developed countries reflect the 
impact of their tax-benefit systems. Evidence for this has been provided, for instance, 
by studies that use microsimulation techniques to simulate the redistributive effect of 
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the tax and benefit systems of those countries.
2 Thus, as Atkinson (2000) emphasises, 
accounting for the redistributive impact of the government budget is crucial when 
looking for explanations of the level of income inequality.  
This paper is concerned with the impact of the Brazilian government’s budget, 
particularly taxes and transfers, on the extent of personal income inequality and 
poverty. Our analysis uses BRAHMS, a tax-benefit microsimulation model that 
provides detailed information on taxes and benefits paid and received by individuals 
and/or households in a representative sample of the Brazilian population. 
The paper is structured in five sections. After this introduction, section 2 discusses the 
method used in this paper, microsimulation modelling. Section 3 briefly describes the 
main features of the Brazilian tax-benefit system, while section 4 presents the data and 
main procedures used in our calculations. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2.  THE MICROSIMULATION APPROACH 
In order to evaluate the redistributional impact of the Brazilian tax-benefit system, one 
needs information about how taxes and benefits operate at the individual level. Because 
the necessary information is often not available in survey data, it is necessary to 
simulate these variables. For this we use a tax-benefit microsimulation model. In this 
section we consider the steps necessary to create a tax-benefit model.
3  
2.1. Microsimulation Modelling 
Due to the great diversity observed among the population and the complexity of the 
Brazilian tax-benefit system, the redistributive analysis of the impact of social and 
fiscal policies requires that a high level of disaggregation be used in order to capture in 
fine detail their effects on the various types of individuals, families and households. 
Ultimately, it is the social and economic diversity typically found in the national 
populations that determines how economic agents will be affected by the tax and 
benefit rules. On the other hand, as different social programs interact with each other 
and with the tax system, it is crucial to take explicitly into account the 
interdependencies within the whole tax-benefit system. The lack of analytical tools that 
properly focus on the poor and the neglect of the issue of how the programs are to be 
financed are major reasons why social and economic policies fail to significantly reduce 
poverty. 
Typically hypothetical families have been used to examine the operation of taxes and 
benefits and impact of reforms. For example the OECD uses this method to calculate 
the  Tax Position of Average Workers. Although a useful method for illustration 
purposes and for comparison across countries, the approach is not very satisfactory for 
looking at tax-benefit policy in a country as usually families which are considered 
“typical” form in fact only a very small proportion of the population. It is desirable 
therefore to look at the population as a whole using representative micro-datasets.  
An approach that follows this method is microsimulation modelling. Recent advances 
in information technology and the availability of large-scale datasets have allowed and 
                                                 
2 See, for example, EUROMOD (2004). 
3 In this paper we draw upon model development lessons learned by a number of the authors as part of 
the EUROMOD project and described in Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2001).   3
stimulated the development of these models. Microsimulation models are computer 
programs that calculate tax liabilities and benefit entitlements for individuals, families 
or households in a nationally representative micro-data sample of the population. The 
model calculates each element of the tax-benefit system in the legal order so that 
interactions between different elements of the system are fully taken into account. 
Calculations for each individual, family or household are weighted to provide results at 
the population level.  
By incorporating the interactions of different elements of the tax-benefit system and by 
taking full account of the diversity of characteristics in the population, this approach 
allows a very detailed analysis of the revenue, distributional and incentive effects of the 
individual policy instruments and the system as a whole. In particular, they give a great 
deal of flexibility to analysts. For example: 
•  They simulate policy instruments that may not already exist in the micro-datasets on 
which they are based. As micro-data is not necessarily collected every year and may 
take time for the data to be available to researchers, microsimulation models can be 
used to simulate more up to date policy rules.  
•  Therefore they have the capability of looking at the incidence of existing policy on 
an existing population and can examine the efficiency of anti-poverty measures in 
actually reducing poverty. 
•  As a simulation mechanism, they are also well placed to look at the incentive 
impact of existing policy. Although the model framework described here is a static 
framework, it is possible to measure the pressures on behaviour such as marginal 
tax rates and replacement rates
4. 
•  The primary advantage of microsimulation models however is that they can 
simulate policy reform. They can thus be used to compute the first round revenue 
effects of reforms. Also, containing both social protection programs and taxation 
instruments, models of this kind can look not only at changes to social policy 
programs but also examine different methods of financing.  
•  The first round distribution of resulting winners and losers, particularly with 
reference to particular target populations, can also be found. 
•  Capturing the heterogeneity of government law, they can examine the interaction of 
different policy instruments. 
•  Incorporating micro-data, they can also be used to look at the distributional impact 
of policy reform. Thus it is possible to see how reforms are incident on households 
of different incomes, examine horizontal redistribution by focusing, for example, on 
families with children, the elderly or the sick. Exploiting the hierarchical nature of 
households, they can also focus in gender dimensions by looking at within 
household sharing and the impact of government policy. 
•  The user-friendly nature of such models makes them suitable for a variety of uses 
and users, both governmental and non-governmental, informing the debate of social 
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and economic policy, and making policy decisions more transparent in terms of 
their impacts on the population. 
The use of microsimulation models therefore, can greatly contribute to improved design 
and efficacy of policies (as argued, for instances, in Atkinson et al., 2002). The models 
provide a powerful aid to policy design and assessment, allowing users to consider how 
expenditure aimed at certain targeted groups is to be financed, how social spending is 
distributed among the population, and how fiscal and social policies impact on the 
different groups of the population. Thus, working with a microsimulation model, policy 
designers and analysts can simulate changes in the existing tax-benefit system, 
performing “what if” experiments and examining their distributional and revenue 
implications (Redmond, Sutherland and Wilson, 1998). For example Piachaud and 
Sutherland (2000) recently used a microsimulation model to examine the policies 
necessary for the UK government to meet its poverty reduction targets. 
However the development of microsimulation models is quite a difficult and expensive 
process. It involves the construction of a software environment to handle the data, 
policy simulation and output routines. The transformation and matching of existing 
micro-datasets into definitions and structures required to simulate tax-benefit laws and 
the translation of the law itself into a computational framework are quite time 
consuming. The latter is a very large task as instruments are often very complicated, 
with particular exemptions for different classes of individual or income source. Also the 
diverse policy instruments, having often been developed by different governmental 
organisations within government, may follow different logic and interact in peculiar 
ways.
5 Another important expense is the actual updating of the model. Government 
policy tends to change year on year and population structures can change too due to the 
number of unemployed in recessions or through demographic changes. Hence in order 
for the model to become out of date, efforts need to be made to update the model, both 
the data and the rules, in regular intervals. As a result of the expense, although a 
number of Western countries and institutions have utilised this technique, there is still 
not widespread use in emerging economies. Yet it could be argued that the benefits of 
these techniques could be relatively more important in emerging countries because of 
the greater proportions in poverty and because of their poorer public finance positions, 
with greater need being required in the design of effective government policy. 
2.2. Microsimulation Modelling in Developing Countries 
One of the issues this paper must consider is the fact that circumstances, systems and 
data may not necessarily be the same in developed economies, where the technique has 
been utilised, and in emerging economies. Atkinson and Bourguignon (1990) carried 
out a study of the lessons of tax-benefit modelling in OECD countries for emerging 
economies. They found that although often more difficult to implement, simulating tax-
benefit systems for these countries should "lead to a comprehensive, powerful and yet 
simple instrument for the design of an efficient redistribution system adapted to the 
specificity of developing countries". Focusing on Brazil as a case study, they found that 
much of the redistribution in the existing Brazilian system in the 1980's relied on 
instruments that were less important in OECD countries. For example, indirect taxes, 
subsidies and the provision of targeted non-cash benefits such as public education and 
subsidised school meals were found to be more important. Instruments more important 
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in OECD systems and often the main instruments in tax-benefit models (personal 
income taxes, social insurance contributions and pensions), were largely confined to the 
modern sector in Brazil and thus of less importance to policy makers. Nevertheless they 
argued that sufficient data existed at the time to simulate many of the Brazilian specific 
instruments in addition to the “classic” ones. They stressed however that merging of 
data from different datasets may be necessary for this purpose. As a consequence of 
recent advances in the analysis of related data-sets (see Deaton, 1998) as well as 
improvements in the availability of data for less developed countries, the use of tax-
benefit modelling techniques needs no longer be limited to countries where such 
models have been in use for some time.  
Atkinson and Bourguignon’s paper set the scene for the construction of tax-benefit 
models for less developed countries. The objective of our study is to go beyond this and 
actually focus more on the practical issues of constructing a tax-benefit model by 
reference to the precise rules of the tax-benefit systems and the detail of the available 
micro-data.  
2.3. The Design of a Microsimulation Model 
A microsimulation framework adopts a hierarchical view of a country’s tax-benefit 
system. In modelling a country’s system, it is desirable to match the “real” system’s 
hierarchy as closely as possible so that the logical representation provides a good 
intuitive equivalent of the original.  
Each tax-benefit system is made up of individual policies. These are elementary 
collections of tax-benefit instruments. Examples for a policy are Income Tax, Social 
Insurance Contributions or Social Assistance Benefits. The policy spine is a list of 
policies indicating the sequence by which they are applied in the tax- benefit system. 
For example, if social insurance contributions are tax deductible, then the entry Social 
Insurance Contributions would have to appear before Income Tax. This is because the 
model needs the amount of social insurance contributions as a prerequisite to 
calculating income tax. On the other hand, if social assistance benefits depend on after 
tax income, then the entry Social Assistance Benefits would have to appear after 
Income Tax since income tax is a necessary input for calculating social assistance 
benefits.
6 At the lowest level is the tax-benefit module, which performs the calculation 
of a certain part of the tax or benefit (e.g., a deduction, or applying a rate schedule to a 
tax base) on each fiscal unit. Only the modules contain actual tax-benefit rules. The 
other levels of the model are necessary to structure these rules and apply them in the 
correct sequence. 
A modular structure allows one, as the model develops, to create a library of modules.
7 
These can be used as “building-blocks” so that when it is necessary to incorporate a 
new tax or benefit instrument, it will often not be necessary to program any new tax-
benefit rules. Instead, it may be possible for existing modules to be used. They can be 
re-arranged in any order necessary. A high level of parameterisation ensures that the 
same modules can be used for a multitude of different purposes.  
                                                 
6 In a few cases, it might be desirable to deviate from a purely linear sequence of policies. If there are 
optional policies, which the tax payer/benefit recipient can choose from, it would be necessary to 
simulate all the individual options (e.g., individual or joint taxation) and then apply some rule for 
choosing between them (e.g., by assuming a decision which would maximise disposable income). 
7 In a national model one builds up a library of historic instruments and reforms that were experimented 
with.   6 
Concepts that a user may want to change in the model and thus should be parameterised 
for ease of use include: 
•  Updating of dataset to year of simulation. As the year of the dataset may not 
necessarily be the same as the year of simulation (the year policy rules are taken 
from), it will be necessary to update the dataset to account for differences in the 
intervening period. For this purpose external information will be needed. Updating 
which may be required include allowance for inflation/income growth by variable 
or allowance for changing population structure by altering the weights. 
•  The definition of the fiscal unit (e.g., individual, household, married couple, 
families with children - including the definition of a “child”) which is relevant for 
the module,  
•  Income concepts (e.g., the definition of taxable income, “means” for a means-tested 
benefit, etc.). In order to simulate the effect of widening the tax base or of 
incorporating new policies in a particular income concept such as disposable 
income, users may want to alter with ease the definition of these concepts. 
•  All relevant amounts (such as thresholds, limits, allowances, rates, number of tax 
bands, etc.) necessary for applying the relevant tax or benefit rules should be 
parameterised to enable non-structural policy reforms to be simulated with ease. 
Behavioural Response 
As a static modelling framework, the model only measures the day after effect. 
However it is clear that reforms may have a behavioural response. For example the 
introduction of the Bolsa Escola program in a number of Brazilian cities which gives 
cash benefits to poor families whose children continue on in school until 14, saw school 
dropout rates decrease and school attendance increase (Schiefelbein, 1997). Thus the 
cost of the program would have been higher than a static analysis would have indicated. 
Incorporating dynamic processes like this would be beyond the scope of an initial stage 
of construction of a microsimulation model. It would require extra algorithms to be 
coded in the framework and in addition, a priori, the micro-behavioural information 
required would not have been available for a reform of this kind. However, as an 
alternative, sensitivity analyses could be carried out. It would be possible for analysts to 
vary the proportion of those eligible for the new instrument. Routines of this kind are 
analogous to the implementation of marginal tax-rate calculators. On this point some 
effort may also be necessary to specify appropriate definitions of marginal tax 
calculations in the framework for a Brazilian perspective.  
Validation  
Once the tax-benefit system has been coded, the data are passed through the model. At 
this stage, one discovers whether all the variables required by the model algorithms 
have in fact been included in the dataset and whether they are in the correct format. 
Once this works, one must determine whether all the interactions between the simulated 
components operate correctly. The validation process is therefore one of the largest 
components in building a microsimulation model. 
Typically the first stage in this process is to compare the output of the model for sets of 
hypothetical households against manually calculated taxes and benefits. Although the   7
rules may in fact be correctly coded, simulated aggregates may not necessarily match 
official aggregates. The next stage of the validation process is therefore to compare the 
aggregate outputs against those in official statistics. Useful external sources of data for 
validation include official figures, other studies, other survey data, existing models, etc. 
 
3.  OVERVIEW OF THE BRAZILIAN TAX-BENEFIT SYSTEM 
 
This section briefly describes the main instruments of the Brazilian transfers and tax 
systems.
8  
3.1. Transfer System 
The Brazilian social protection system is strongly based on contributory, social 
insurance benefits, while means-tested social assistance programmes occupy a marginal 
position. Pensions alone account for about 83% of total cash transfers to households, or 
about 11 per cent of GDP – a percentage above the OECD average, despite Brazil’s 




The Brazilian public pension system comprises a general regime for private sector 
workers and multiple special regimes for civil servants at different levels of 
government. These regimes are mandatory and of the pay-as-you-go type. 
 
Pension regime for private sector workers 
 
The scheme for private sector workers pays retirement benefit under two main 
circumstances. The first is the old-age pension, which is paid to male (female) urban 
workers aged 65 (60) who have contributed for at least 15 years. Alternatively, 
retirement benefits are paid to those who accumulated 35 (for men) and 30 (for 
women) years of contribution, without age limit requirements.  
 
It should be noted that rural workers are only required to provide evidence of 15 years 
of rural activities to be eligible for a minimum pension at age 60 (for men) or 55 (for 
women), whether or not they have previously contributed to the system. In fact, rural 
pensions can be considered as part of social assistance, because they are essentially 
non-contributory. 
 
Pension benefits are subject to a ceiling and a floor. The ceiling is equivalent to the 
same cap that applies to contribution rates (1,869.34 reais, in 2003). The floor is equal 
to the official minimum wage (240 reais, in 2003). Currently, about 60 per cent of all 
benefits are equal to the social security floor, including almost all rural workers’ 
pensions. In January 2004, nearly 18 million pension benefits were granted, 37 per cent 
of which being paid to rural pensioners.   
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Ministry of the Economy (2005) and the Ministry of Social Security’s statistical database 
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Pension regimes for civil servants 
 
Special schemes for civil servants exist at different levels of government. These 
schemes differ slightly from each other in terms of contribution rates, but in almost all 
cases they are significantly more generous than the scheme for private sector workers. 
For instance, under the civil servants regime, male workers retiring at the age of 60 (55 
for female workers), with 35 years of contribution (30 for female workers), are entitled 
to pensions equal to 100 per cent of their last salary, without a cap.
9  
 
In fact, while private sector pensions average less than two minimum wages, public 
sector pensions in the federal government are, on average, seven times higher. Overall, 
in January 2004 the civil servant regimes together paid pensions to nearly 3 million 
former civil servants (about 14 per cent of total retirees), and accounted for about 40 
per cent of total pension expenditure. 
 
Annual bonus for pensioners  
 
All pensioners, both in the private sector and in the civil service, receive the annual 
bonus, an extra payment equal to their monthly pension. 
 
Contributory means-tested benefits 
 
These benefits are paid to insured private sector workers. Entitlement is subject to an 
individual income test, irrespective of the economic condition of the household in 
which the person lives. This kind of benefit amounts to about 5 per cent of total cash 
transfers. The contributory means-tested benefits are:
10 
 
Unemployment insurance (seguro desemprego) 
 
The maximum amount of this benefit in 2003 was 449.04 reais (a little below two 
minimum wages) per month. Each unemployed worker may receive the benefit for up 
to five months. In 2003 the number of recipients of unemployment insurance was about 
5.0 million people. 
 
Salary bonus (abono salarial) 
 
This benefit consists of a yearly payment – equal to the monthly minimum wage – 
made to formal-sector workers with a monthly salary lower than two minimum wages. 
The programme benefited a total of 5.6 million workers in 2003. 
 
Child benefit (salário família) 
 
This benefit, amounting in 2003 to 13.48 reais per children under fourteen years of age 
(or disabled of any age), is paid to employees who earn 429.00 reais or less. This 
programme covered approximately 6.0 million workers in 2003. 
 
                                                 
9 A reform enacted in 2003 reduced the replacement rate for civil servants, but the new rule only applies 
to entrants. 
10 Other contributory (but not means-tested) benefits are maternity and sick leave and accident insurance, 
which are not analyzed in this study due to lack of data to simulate them.   9
Non-contributory means tested benefits 
 





Old-age and disability assistance benefits 
 
These benefits consist of the payment of a minimum wage per month to those who are 
over 65 or disabled, with per capita household income below one-quarter of the 
minimum wage. The combined number of beneficiaries of these programmes was 




This is a conditional income transfer programme targeted to poor households. It 
resulted from the amalgamation in later 2003 of four federal social assistance benefits 
(Bolsa-Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, Cartão Alimentação e Auxílio-Gás). Entitlement to 
this programme involves school attendance (for children and youths) and prenatal and 
primary care (for pregnant women and children under six years of age). In 2004 the 
number of beneficiaries exceeded 5.0 million households. As the average benefit is 
modest (about 71 reais per month per household), the programme’s share of overall 
cash transfers is quite small (less than 3 per cent). 
3.2. Tax System 
 
Brazil’s tax revenue represented 35 per cent of GDP in 2003, a ratio close to the OECD 
average. Income tax (combining the personal and corporate systems) raises about 20 
per cent of total tax revenue. Although the income tax records do not allow us to 
completely separate personal tax revenue from corporate tax revenue, it is estimated 
that personal income tax revenue accounts for about half of total income tax revenue. 
Payroll taxes contribute to 24 per cent of total tax revenue. Taxes on goods and 
services (of the value added type) respond for nearly one-third of the total tax burden, 
and property taxes for 3 per cent. The remainder of tax revenue (about 20 per cent) is 
mainly raised by turnover taxes. 
 
In its present version the microssimulation model used in this work simulates only the 
personal income tax and the employee’s social security contribution, which we briefly 
describes below.  
 
Employee’s social security contribution    
 
Private sector employees’ marginal contribution rates to the social security system 
ranges from 7.6 to 11.0 per cent, subject to a cap. In effect, for salaries above the cap 
(1.869,34 reais per month), the marginal employee contribution rate falls to zero.
11 
There is a special contribution scheme for rural workers, based on the 
commercialization of agricultural products (for those who do commercialise their 
production). However, this scheme has covered only about 14 per cent of rural 
pensions’ expenditure. 
                                                 
11 Employers contribute a flat 20 per cent rate regardless of the cap.   10
 
For civil servants, contribution rates vary among government levels. At the federal 
level, employees contribute with a flat 11 per cent rate, whereas states levy a 
contribution ranging from 6 to 14 per cent. 
 
It is worth noting that in 2003 less than one-half of the labour force contributed to the 
social security system. The combined deficit of the publicly managed social security 
schemes is about 5 per cent of GDP, which is financed out of taxes based on turnover. 
 
Personal Income Tax 
 
Personal monthly income was taxed in 2003 according to the following rate schedule: 
an exemption threshold (approximately equivalent to 4.4 minimum wages) and two 
marginal tax rates, 15 per cent and 27,5 per cent. The main tax reliefs built into the 
income tax system are the deductions for each dependent person, public and private 
insurance contributions, and educational and medical expenses. Alternatively, there is 
the option of a standard general deduction, equivalent to 20 per cent of taxable income. 
Given the relatively high effective exemption threshold, only about 23 per cent of the 
Brazilian economically active population might be subject to the payment of income 
tax. 
4.  SIMULATING BRAZIL’S TAX-TRANSFER SYSTEM 
In this study we implement a prototype tax-benefit microsimulation model for Brazil, 
the Brazilian Household Microsimulation System (BRAHMS). The model simulates 
household sector taxes and cash transfers based on the 2003 household survey Pesquisa 
Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios – PNAD. The PNAD is the main microdata source 
of demographic and socio-economic household characteristics in Brazil. It is a 
nationally representative rural-and-urban survey covering all Brazilian regions with the 
exception of the North region's rural area. PNAD's sample size is quite large, including 
133,255 households and 384,834 individuals. 
 
The information on pension receipts is taken directly from the PNAD. The data does 
not allow us to separate pensions paid to former civil servants from pensions paid to 
former private employees, or even those contributory pensions from the old-age 
assistance benefit. Thus our analysis takes these three types of pensions in aggregate. 
While for the incidence analysis conducted in this study it is not necessary to simulate 
these transfer instruments, future analysis of potential reforms will require this. 
However as is common in static microsimulation models, the simulation of 
contribution-based old age pensions is often difficult due to a lack of data on past 
income and years of contribution. 
 
BRAHMS simulates the annual bonus, the unemployment benefit, the wage bonus, the 
family benefit and the Bolsa-Escola programme.
12 The Bolsa-Escola programme was 
the most important of the four income support schemes that were grouped together in 
the Bolsa Família programme in later 2003, and was the only one for which the PNAD 
provides information on its effective incidence, thus allowing us to avoid making the 
                                                 
12 A set of social expenditure items that so far have not been included but which are often relatively more 
important in developing countries is non-cash social spending, such as health and education benefits. 
This is especially important for households outside the modern sector as they are often excluded from 
coverage of social security benefits. This is another future development of this model.    11




As there is no direct information in the PNAD for the personal income tax and the 
social security contribution, BRAHMS also simulates their values applying the 
legislation of the tax system to each individual or family in the PNAD microdata set. 
The estimates were then compared to available administrative data and adjusted to 
better reflect the effective incidence on these taxes.  
5.  RESULTS 
In this section we use the BRAHMS model to describe the incidence of different types 
of government transfers and taxes on households. To do this, we use a set of income 
concepts. The starting point is initial income, which is the total annual income of all 
members of the household before the deduction of taxes or the addition of any social 
benefits. Cash benefits are added to initial income to obtain gross income. Personal 
income tax and employee social security contribution are deducted from gross income 
to give disposable income.  
Table 6 presents some socio-economic characteristics of the Brazilian households by 
decile group. This information may help to better understand the results about the 
incidence of taxes and benefits. 
4.1. Total Redistribution 
As said in section 1, the relatively low levels of income inequality of developed 
countries found in Figure 1, to an extent, reflect the impact of their tax and benefit 
systems.
14 By contrast, Brazil has not been able to use tax and transfers policies 
effectively to reduce income inequality. This is illustrated in Table 1, which 
summarises the estimated impacts of cash transfers and direct taxes on the distribution 
of income in Brazil. It shows that the richest 10% of households (according to per 
capita gross income) receive 46% of all initial income. This compares with only 0.8% 
for households in the bottom decile group.  
The distribution of gross income, which includes government cash transfers, shows a 
very similar pattern as the distribution of initial income. In particular, the top decile’s 
share remains virtually the same (45.8%), while the share appropriated by the first 
decile remains unchanged at 0.8%. Note that there is a small increase in ratio of the 
income share of the top 20% to the share of the bottom 20%, from 23.1 to 23.8. 
The third column of Table 1 shows that the personal income tax and the employee 
social security contribution, altogether, reduce the share of the richest 10% to 44.1% 
but leave unchanged the share of the poorest 10% (0.8%). This effect reflects the fact 
that almost all personal income tax revenue (97%) and about 36% of social security 
contributions are collected from the top income decile, while the average burden of 
direct taxes on the first decile is insignificant (see Table 2). 
4.2. Progressivity of Individual Instruments 
                                                 
13 The Bolsa-Família programme was not simulated because it was not captured in the 2003 PNAD data. 
The programme was implemented in October 2003, while the PNAD data were collected taking 
September 2003 as the month of reference. 
14 See, for instance, Beer et al. (2001).   12
In this section, we consider the redistributive effect and the progressivity of the 
individual instruments of the tax-benefit system. We use measures based on the Lorenz 
Curve to examine the degree of redistribution and progressivity.
15 The Lorenz Curve for 
pre-tax market income (LM) is simply a graph of the cumulative population share versus 
the cumulative income for the population ranked by order of their income. The Gini 
coefficient is a standard index of inequality, defined in equation (1):  
  dp p L G M M ∫ − =
1
0 ) ( 2 1        ( 1 )  
where p is the cumulative population share and  ) (p LM , the Lorenz Curve at point p.  
A population with no income inequality would have a Lorenz Curve of 45° and 
therefore a Gini of 0. If Lorenz Curve 1 lies completely outside curve 2, then it is 
possible to say that population 1 has greater inequality than population 2, with G1 > G2. 
However if the Lorenz Curves cross, it is not possible to make inequality comparisons 
without using further value judgments.  
The index used here to measure redistribution is the Reynolds-Smolensky index, which 
is defined as the difference between the Gini coefficients for “base” income (defined 
here as initial income M) and post-instrument income (M’), defined in equation (2): 
L = GM – GM’                                                                                                                                                                           (2) 
Progressivity is a measure of the difference between the level of redistribution of an 
instrument relative to an instrument with the same revenue effect but where the effect is 
proportional to income. It is therefore a measure of the incidence of an instrument. In 
this paper we use the Kakwani index of progressivity, which is the difference between 
the concentration index C for the instrument T in question and the Gini for initial 
income: 
K = CT -  GM                                                                                                                    (3)  
The index CT is similar to the Gini measure, being derived from a type of Lorenz curve, 
called concentration curve, in which the individuals are ordered according to their 
initial incomes, and the proportion of the population is related to the corresponding 
proportion of the instrument incident on those individuals (tax paid or transfer 
received).  
If policy instruments are based on characteristics other than income, then income units 
may have a different order of incomes before and after the operation of the instrument. 
For example pensions are targeted at households with elderly people and so households 
with elderly people will receive subsidies while other households will not. This type of 
redistribution is known as horizontal redistribution. Changes in the order of income 
units in a distribution will result in the Lorenz curve of post-instrument income being 
different from its concentration curve. The Atkinson-Plotnick reranking index is the 
measure of horizontal equity we use, defined as: 
 P = (GM’ – CM’)/2GM’                                                                                                                                                       (4) 
                                                 
15 The methods described here are standard methods for examining the degree of redistribution and 
progressivity in tax-benefit system (see, for example, Palme, 1996, and Creedy, 1997).   13
The concentration index, CM’, involves ranking by M and the Gini inequality index, 
GM’, involves ranking by M’, so that an absence of re-ranking implies that P = 0 
(Creedy, 1997). 
The redistributive effect of a policy instrument depends upon the size of the instrument 
and the progressivity or degree of targeting. For example, a well-targeted low value 
instrument may have a lower degree of redistribution than a poorly-targeted high value 
instrument.  
The average amounts of taxes paid by each household decile group are shown in Table 
2. Although the income tax is usually at the centre of the tax policy debate in Brazil, 
one can observe that the burden of payroll taxes is greater for all household groups, 
except for the top decil. Personal income tax is important only to the households in the 
top decile group, representing, in average, 7.2% of their gross income. 
In Table 3 we decompose the amount of the redistribution due to each of the 
instruments. We consider first how targeted expenditure is utilising the Kakwani 
progressivity index. Reflecting progressivity patterns found throughout the world, 
personal income taxes are the most progressive of the direct taxes, with a Kakwani 
index of 0.146. Overall, as shown in Table 2, the burden of social security contribution 
borne by households is higher than the income tax burden, except for the top decile 
group. This reflects the fact that there is a ceiling in the contribution of private 
employees. Thus social insurance contributions are progressive but less so (0.009) than 
the personal income tax system. One should note that the low level of social security 
contribution in the first deciles reflects the fact that there is a sizeable proportion of 
informal workers in these income groups. 
Combining the size of the instruments (column A) with the knowledge we have about 
their progressivity (column B), we can determine how redistributive each instrument is. 
Personal income taxation although of relatively low importance, has the highest 
redistributive effect among the direct taxes, driven primarily by the strength of the 
progressivity effect. 
Concerning the transfer system, Table 3 shows that pensions are the most important 
category at 25% of initial income, with all other benefit types being less than 2,1% of 
initial income. Each of the transfer types is proportionally more targeted at the poorest 
deciles. However we must note that the ranking measure used by these statistics is 
initial income, in other words income before transfers and taxes. The inclusion of the 
transfers in household income may move a poor household measured on this income up 
the income distribution. We see this effect in the Atkinson-Plotnick reranking index, 
where pensions induce the largest reranking of households of any instrument. When we 
rank by gross income as the case in Table 2, we can see that the targeting of pensions is 
reduced or even eliminated by this reranking.   
The annual bonus and unemployment benefits are the next biggest transfer categories. 
Reranking is much lower. The wage bonus is the least targeted transfer. On the other 
hand, the Bolsa Escola instrument, because it is not restricted to households in the 
formal sectors, is very targeted, with Kakwani index of 1.031. 
Turning to the redistributive impact of the instruments, we see that on the whole 
redistribution is quite small, reducing inequality by about 6% points. Most of this is   14
driven by the pension system. However as per the discussion above, we note the degree 
of reranking due to the system. 
4.3. Comparison with Other Countries 
How does the redistribution observed in Brazil compare with redistribution in other 
countries? In this section we contrast redistribution in Brazil with that observed in 
fifteen countries of the European Union. 
Table 5 shows the Gini coefficient for the initial and disposable income concepts for the 
sixteen countries considered. The size of the levelling of income distribution through 
the benefit and tax system can be measured by means of the Gini coefficient. The 
difference between the Gini coefficients of the different income concepts is indicative 
of the degree of redistribution inherent in the difference between incomes. We notice 
that the reduction in the Gini coefficient due to the tax-benefit system is much smaller 
in Brazil than in the EU countries. In the latter, the Gini coefficient is reduced, on 
average, in 37%, from 0.52 to 0.32, whereas in Brazil the Gini coefficient is reduced in 
only 10%, from 0.63 to 0.56. Even the EU country with the lowest redistribution, Italy, 
has triple the reduction in Brazil. 
4.4. Poverty Efficiency of Benefits 
Although the reduction of income inequality is one of the objectives of taxation and 
transfer systems, a more focused objective is the reduction of poverty. Here we consider 
how effective Brazilian transfer instruments are at reducing poverty. In Table 4 we 
describe a number of measures (see Weisbrod, 1970; Beckerman, 1979) of the poverty 
efficiency of transfers in Brazil compared with means-tested instruments in Southern 
European countries, as reported in O’Donoghue et al. (2003), for each of the schemes 
mentioned before. Figure 3, due to Beckerman (1979), describes the impact of transfers 
on disposable income. The measures we use to examine the target efficiency of social 
assistance are based on this diagram.  
•  The first measure is Vertical Expenditure Efficiency (VEE), meaning the share of 
total expenditure going to households who are poor before the transfer and is equal 
to (A + B)/(A + B +C) from Figure 3. 
•  The next indicator is the Poverty Reduction Efficiency (PRE), defined as the 
fraction of total expenditure allowing poor households to reach the poverty line 
without overcoming it and is defined as (A)/(A + B +C). 
•  The Spillover index (S) is a measure of the excess of expenditure with respect to the 
amount strictly necessary to reach the poverty line, (B)/(A + B). Combining, we can 
see that the VEE (1 - S) = PRE. 
In fact, these three measures are not sufficient to evaluate how good a transfer system is 
in fighting poverty: A transfer program could be very efficient in reaching the poor, but 
its amount could be too low to produce a significant increase in the living standards of 
the beneficiaries. We thus need another indicator, the Poverty Gap Efficiency (PGE), 
which shows how effective a cash benefit is in filling the poverty gap, A/(A+D). The 
measures compare the effectiveness of instruments in closing the pre-transfer poverty 
gap, defined in terms of disposable per capita income before transfers, and with the 
poverty line given by half the minimum wage (120.00 reais, equivalent to 63,8% of 
median post-transfer disposable per capita income).    15
Table 4 reports the target efficiency results for Brazil and for the Southern European 
countries. The Brazilian instruments can be divided into two groups, (i) contributory 
benefits: pension, annual bonus, unemployment benefit, salary bonus and child benefit; 
and (ii) Bolsa-Escola, which is an assistance benefit.  
In the first group, the poverty efficiency is low. In fact only 17% of pension expenditure 
reduces poverty, with the remaining proportion bringing people who would be below 
the poverty line above the poverty line or in the case of 48% of the instrument going to 
households above the poverty line even in the absence of the instrument. Efficiency is 
also low for the wage bonus, with over two-thirds of the benefit going to people above 
the poverty line. For the unemployment benefit, the focus on the poor represents 39% 
of the expenditure with the benefit. The child benefit is the most efficient among the 
contributory benefits, with about half of its expenditure reducing poverty. 
The  Bolsa-Escola exhibits a high degree of targeting, with PRE of nearly 80%, 
indicating that it is an efficient anti-poverty instrument. However because this 
instrument is relatively unimportant in terms of expenditure, they reduce poverty by 
less than pensions despite the low targeting of the latter.  
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
This study offers additional evidence to the conclusion reached by Chu et al. (2002) that 
the redistributive effects of tax-benefit systems in developing (and transition) countries 
are much less expressive than those observed in developed countries. In the case of 
Brazil, however, the problem cannot be associated to a low tax-to-GDP ratio, but to the 
fact that social spending bears little relation to need. This is particularly true of social 
security pensions, which are concentrated on the most well-off households. Although 
assistance programs like Bolsa Escola are well focused on the most vulnerable 
population, the budget devoted to these programs is still a minuscule share of total 
social spending. 
Many researchers and policy-makers in Brazil have argued that the tax side of the 
budget should play a more significant redistributive role. However, the predominance 
of indirect taxes and the way the progressivity of the personal income tax interacts with 
the highly unequal income distribution render the tax system a poor redistributive tool. 
Furthermore, experience has shown that the most affluent groups have managed to 
benefit most from tax breaks and allowances or indeed from any opportunity for tax 
reduction (or evasion) provided by the tax legislation in Brazil.  
In a society as unequal as the Brazilian one, political economy considerations should be 
central to any proposal intended to improve the way tax and benefits are distributed 
amongst its population. Our view is that the tax-benefit system should be as simple and 
transparent as possible, with the expenditure side of the budget as the fundamental 
redistributive instrument – primarily through the provision of basic services and well-
targeted direct transfers to households. We think that the visibility and understanding of 
the tax and benefit system is a key condition to motivate and empower people to 
demand, through the democratic process, more effective redistributive policies.  
In this paper in addition to the policy implications of this study, we have also addressed 
a number of potential technical modelling developments that are desirable and as such 
create an agenda for future work:   16
1.  In order to aid future policy reform analysis, it would be desirable to extend the 
number of instruments simulated in the model to include as many benefit 
instruments as is technically possible. This would allow analysts to evaluate 
benefit design changes. 
2.  Part of the revenue raised by some of the taxes included in the present study is 
used to finance government services that have an important effect on household 
living standard, such as health and education. However, this study has focused 
on the impact on current monetary incomes. A more comprehensive approach, 
simulating non-cash welfare services, would result in a more significant impact 
of the Brazilian tax-benefit system on the welfare of the lower income groups. 
3.  As the most important revenue source, indirect taxation is a large potential area 
for reform and analysis. However because our data source, the PNAD, does not 
incorporate expenditure information, imputation from other sources is required. 
It is planned to include indirect taxes in our model by statistically matching 
household expenditure information from other surveys into our base survey. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1 – Percentage shares of household income, ratios of share 







Decile  Group     
Bottom  0,8 0,8 0,8 
2
nd    1,9 1,8 1,9 
3
rd    2,6 2,6 2,8 
4
th    3,5 3,6 3,7 
5
th    4,6 4,7 4,8 
6
th    6,4 6,1 6,3 
7
th    7,0 7,8 8,0 
8
th    10,8 10,7 10,9 
9
th    16,3 16,2 16,6 
Top  46,0 45,8 44,1 
     
All  households  100 100 100 
     
Ratio of share of 
top 20% to bottom 
20% 
23.1 23.8 22.5 
     
Gini  coefficient  0,6301 0,5783 0,5646 
Notes:  
1. Initial Income: total annual income of all members of the household before the 
deduction of taxes or the addition of any state benefits. 
2. Gross Income: Initial Income plus state benefits. 
3. Disposable Income: Gross Income minus direct taxes and employee social 
security contributions. 
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Table 2 – Average Incomes, Taxes and Transfers by Decile Group - Brazil – 2003 
(R$ per Year) 
Deciles of Individuals Ranked by Per Capita Gross Household Income   
Bottom 2nd    3
rd   4th   5th   6th   7th   8
th   9th   Top 
Initial Income  1,307  3,044 4,036 4,691 6,221 7,774 6,949 11,693 16,437 42,734
Transfers  271 759 1,215 1,433 1,889 1,743 2,933  3,123  4,677  11,827
Pension  93 474 863 1,099 1,502 1,408 2,549  2,711  4,203  10,856
Annual Bonus  8  39 72 92 125 117 212 226 350 905
Unemployment Benefit  56 68 98 103 123 119 103  123 93 56
Wage Bonus  12 25 43 40 53 47 40 43 24  8
Family Benefit  20 68 79 64 59 40 24 16  7  2
Bolsa Escola  81  84 61 35 26 11 4 2 1 0
Gross Income  1,578  3,803 5,251 6,124 8,110 9,516 9,881 14,815 21,114 54,561
Direct Taxes  11 70 131 184 281 379 388  677  1,067  5,607
Social Contribution  11 70 131 184 281 379 387  670  948  1,701
Income Tax  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8  119  3,906




Table 3. Progressivity and Redistributive Effect of the Brazilian Tax-Benefit 
Instruments 








  A B C D 
Taxes      
Personal Income Tax  0.0434 0.1462 0.0047 0.0019 
Social Contribution – Employee  0.0457 0.0092 0.0001 0.0003 
Direct Taxes  0.0891 0.0758 0.0050 0.0024 
      
Benefits      
Pension  0.2495 0.7396 0.0442 0.1034 
Annual Bonus  0.0208 0.7396 0.0123 0.0028 
Unemployed Benefit  0.0078 0.5692 0.0038 0.0006 
Wage Bonus  0.0027 0.4992 0.0013 0.0000 
Family Benefit  0.0028 0.7054 0.0019 0.0000 
Bolsa-Escola Program        0.0020    1.0306 0.0021 0.0000 
Total Benefits        0.2856          0.7344          0.0519          0.1113   
Note: The base income used is initial income. In other words, the progressivity of an income is 
expressed relative to the progressivity of initial income. The rate refers to the instrument as a 
proportion of initial income and redistribution measures the change in the distribution of income 
through the inclusion of the instrument in question.   21
Table 4. Poverty Efficiency of Brazilian Benefits compared with Social Assistance 
Instruments in Southern European Countries 
 VEE  PRE  S  PGE 
Brazil 51.4 17.1 66.7  45.7
Pension 51.8 17.2 66.9  40.0
Annual bonus  51.8 44.2 14.7  8.6
Unemployment benefit  38.6 32.4 16.1  2.4
Wage bonus  31.5 28.9 8.3  0.7
Family benefit  51.8 49.5 4.5  1.3
Bolsa Escola  80.7 79.5 1.5  1.5
        
Social Assistance (Means-tested Child Benefits)         
France 45.5 36.5 19.8  41.9
Greece 26.2 24.3 7.2  4.4
Italy 63.4 56.3 11.2  19.9
Portugal 33.2 32.5 2.0  15
Spain 55.9 51.7 7.5  6.8
        
Social Assistance (Other Means-tested Benefits)         
France 60.0 43.2 28.0  72.5
Greece 55.3 47.2 14.6  23.9
Italy 51.9 39.3 24.4  14.4
Portugal 60.5 46.4 23.3  30.9
Spain 53.5 39.9 25.4  33
Source: Brazil - authors’ calculations; other countries – O’Donoghue et al. (2003) 
Notes: (1) Poverty Gap is as a percentage of total disposable income; (2) Poverty Headcount as a 
percentage of total population; (3) VEE - Vertical Expenditure Efficiency, PRE - Poverty Reduction 
Efficiency, S - Spillover Index, PGE - Poverty Gap Efficiency. 
 
Table 5 – Impact of Transfers and taxation on Income 











Finland  0.48 0.25 0.49 
Belgium  0.50 0.26 0.48 
Denmark  0.46 0.24 0.48 
Austria  0.44 0.23 0.47 
Luxembourg  0.48 0.26 0.47 
Germany  0.47 0.26 0.45 
France  0.49 0.29 0.41 
Sweden  0.50 0.30 0.40 
Netherlands  0.41 0.25 0.39 
United  Kingdom 0.50 0.31 0.38 
Spain  0.52 0.33 0.37 
Ireland  0.52 0.32 0.37 
European  Union  15  0.51 0.32 0.37 
Greece  0.48 0.34 0.31 
Portugal  0.51 0.36 0.30 
Italy  0.50 0.35 0.29 
Brazil  0.63 0.56 0.10 
Source: European countries - EUROMOD (2004); Brazil - authors’ calculations 
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Table 6 – Household Characteristics - Brazil 
 Deciles groups ranked by per capita gross household income 
 Bot-
tom 
23456789  T o p  B r a z i l   P o o r  
Average Number per 
Household 
    
      
Number of individuals      
children (up to 16 years) 
 
2.4 2.0 1.5 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4  1.1  2.1
working age adults (17 to 64 
years) 
2.3 2.4 2.3 2.4 1.9 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.0  2.2  2.4
old age adults (65 years or 
more) 
0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3  0.2  0.1
      
Economically active people  1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.6  1.8  1.9
      
Composition (percentage)      
      
Household type      
   couple with children  62.4 64.8 55.0 57.7 43.7 52.3 48.8 45.4 45.1 39.6  51.5  63.8
   couple without children  6.2 5.6 12.2 11.9 15.6 16.1 17.4 18.5 19.6  22.3  14.4  6.1
   mother with children  22.0 23.2 22.6 21.6 16.2 18.4 16.6 14.7 14.2 10.5  18.1  22.4
   alone person  6.1 1.5 2.7 2.6 18.2 6.5 10.0 15.0 14.1  21.2  9.9  3.6
   other  3.3 4.8 7.4 6.2 6.2 6.6 7.3 6.4 7.0  6.3  6.1  4.1
      
Occupation (head of household)      
   f o r m a l  e m p l o y e e   7 . 42 1 . 42 4 . 72 9 . 42 5 . 33 1 . 33 1 . 32 9 . 32 6 . 3   2 3 . 6   2 4 . 8   1 6 . 5
   informal employee  21.4 23.9 18.6 16.4 12.0 11.8 11.0 8.8 7.8  6.2  13.8  22.4
   civil servant  1.0 2.1 2.3 3.1 3.5 5.1 6.2 7.8 9.6  12.2  5.2  0.5
   self-employed  31.4 26.9 24.0 24.3 18.7 23.8 22.7 22.0 20.7 16.0  22.9  29.0
   employer  0.9 0.9 1.4 2.1 1.9 3.6 4.2 5.9 10.1  18.4  4.9  1.0
   own consumption  3.6 2.3 2.5 2.0 3.4 1.5 1.4 1.5 0.9  0.3  2.0  2.7
   other occupied  0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4  0.4  0.4  1.7
   retired non-occupied  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3  0.5  0.4  0.3
   other non-occupied  33.5 21.7 25.6 21.9 34.5 22.2 22.4 23.8 23.9  22.3  25.5  25.9
      
Geographical Area      
   metropolitan  43.5 50.9 53.5 55.0 55.9 54.1 56.0 54.6 52.5  47.5  33.2  25.0
   urban non metropolitan  25.6 23.8 26.6 29.5 29.6 34.1 34.2 38.0 42.8  49.8  52.4  48.4
   rural  30.9 25.3 19.9 15.5 14.5 11.8 9.8 7.3 4.7  2.7  14.3  26.6
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Figure 1 
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             Source: Siqueira, Nogueira e Levy (2003) 
 
 
Figure 2. The Efficiency of Social Assistance 
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